Examining the pager-walkie-talkie-linked explosions in Lebanon and its likely challenges to global order, peace, and security.
Key Takeaways
Last week, the pager-walkie-talkie-linked explosions in Lebanon have opened a new era of war. The explosions resulted in the death of over 3 dozen Lebanese and injuries to over 3000 people, the majority of them belonging to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Islamic militant outfit in Lebanon.
Though the hands of Mossad, Israel’s spy agency are suspected in this sensitive operation, many key elements of this operation such as the manufacturers of the devices or how they made their way into the pockets of Hezbollah cadres, etc. are shrouded in secrecy.
Taiwanese authorities have denied making these pagers bearing its brand name, but attributed, without evidence, its origin to the Budapest-registered BAC Consulting firm. At the same time, Hungarian authorities claimed that BAC Consulting is only a trading intermediary with no manufacturing sites in the country.
Similarly, Japanese firm ICOM said that the model of its walkie-talkie linked to the blasts was discontinued a decade ago. Lebanon’s communications ministry has also confirmed this claim. Thus, 2 possibilities arise.
Taking the above cues into account, the needle of suspicion definitely points towards Mossad and Israeli Military Intelligence. Perhaps, a brief backgrounder of the Israeli intelligence network will help us to appreciate how professionally competent they are in undertaking highly sensitive undercover operations.
Formed in 1949 as the Central Institute for Coordination, by Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, the Mossad has now emerged as one of the most formidable spy agencies in the world. The motto of the Mossad is based on Biblical scriptures which say ‘where there is no guidance a nation falls, but in an abundance of counsellors, there is safety.’
True to this motto, the intelligence network, notably the Mossad, made significant contributions to the survival and progress of Israel, as the country has been facing continuous threats from the Arab world, especially from militant organizations like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, Hezbollah, etc. The Mossad, through timely collection of intelligence, covert operations and counter-terrorism strategies could help the nation to overcome these challenges.
The operations of the Mossad are highly secretive. They have specialized wings to undertake extremely sensitive and difficult tasks such as the assassination of potential enemies of Israel, commando attack of targets and the destruction of money network of terrorist groups. The Mossad agents – just like hunting dogs- meticulously pursue their main enemies till they achieve their mission.
A unique example was the detection and execution of Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann in 1960. Eichmann, who had been living in Argentina for more than a decade under the name of Ricardo Klement, was abducted, kept in a hideout for days, smuggled to Israel, tried and finally executed. In many instances, just like ‘Sparrow-squads’ of KGB, the Mossad has extremely talented and charming female officers and agents who were successful in trapping prominent individuals especially the opponents of Israel from the Arab world.
If we analyse the ‘techno-war’ of Mossad/other intelligence agencies of Israel, two unique features emerge.
Since the formation of Israel, the Arab world notably Iran and Shia-led militant outfits such as PLO, Hamas, Hezbollah and other splinter groups were identified as the potential enemies of Israel.
More than conventional warfare, Israel, with the help of Mossad, adopted non-conventional warfare to strike these enemies from time to time. Their first target, of course, was Iran’s nuclear devices. Thus, Stuxnet computer viruses were used to destroy the nuclear centrifuges. In November 2020, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the Iranian Nuclear scientist and the main brain behind the nuclear project was assassinated by a remote-controlled camera/machine gun mounted on a pick van parked in a deserted farm, adjacent to the route taken by the VIP.
Then, came the series of assassinations of prominent Hamas/Hezbollah leaders. In 1996, Yahya Ayyash, the Hamas bomb expert was killed when his phone exploded in hand. Other Hamas leaders such as Saleh-al-Arouri (Deputy chief), Mohammed Deif (Military chief) and Fuad Shukur (Hezbollah) were also subsequently eliminated through such operations. Perhaps, the most sensational operation was the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas, protected by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. In July 2024, a remotely detonated explosive device hidden in his room in the Iranian capital, Tehran took his life.
The recent operations also demonstrate Mossad’s notable success in the two key areas of technical intelligence generation and development of new tech devices. Hezbollah, just like any other militant or terror outfit, anticipating the vulnerability of the communication channels of their members, secretly switched to pagers and walkie-talkies.
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah chief, sensitized the members that their mobiles were more dangerous than Israeli agents. In order to meet the requirements, Hezbollah had placed orders for pagers and walkie-talkies with firms abroad, whose identities are disputable. Here, the Mossad, seemingly, had made the breakthrough. Either some of these firms were influenced or shell companies of their own were floated to manufacture the counterfeit devices meant for Hezbollah. Thus, pagers with batteries laced with small quantities of high-explosive PETN that can be activated through radio signals were manufactured and supplied to Hezbollah.
The new ‘techno-war’ is the continuation of Israel’s ongoing conflicts against Hamas and Hezbollah with a clear warning to Iran that they can strike their potential targets across the border. The operation could breach Hezbollah’s supply and communication network and has crippled their ability to mobilize forces, coordinate attacks, and manage logistics. Significantly, this would give a tactical upper hand for Israel in their ongoing conflict against Hezbollah. More than that it would give a clear signal to countries like Syria, Egypt, and Jordan that their systems may be vulnerable to similar attacks.
Israel, no doubt, has various geo-strategic and political grounds to justify their ‘techno-war’. However, these operations have posed unprecedented challenges to the global order and peace and security.
Even conventional war strategies would be influenced paving the way for such operations. The supply chain and the communication network of all countries would be subjected to considerable stress and strain, as the countries-irrespective of their technological advancement need to depend on others for a variety of electronic devices, microchips or semiconductors in various sectors including defence.
Countries like China, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, North Korea, etc. are some of the major manufacturing hubs of such products. Once the intelligence agencies, terror groups or non-state actors tamper with these products for their clandestine operations, the panic that they would be creating among nations and the users of such electronic devices would be unpredictable. Perhaps, the best example is the ‘Pegasus controversy’.
The second and most important factor is that terror groups or non-state actors may undertake such operations to browbeat the state or their enemies. Outfits like al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), etc. have no dearth of experts or logistics to manufacture such devices or procure and tamper them by intercepting the supply chains.
Gambetta and Hertog (‘Engineers of Jihad: The Curious Connection between Violent Extremism and Education) chronicled the story of over 260 Jihadist engineers, many of whom started promising careers in the 1950s and 1960s and were hailed as the future leaders of newly independent states in the Muslim world, but had become the architects of various Islamic militant groups in 1980s and demonstrated no qualms about using violence.
Such trends continue world over. Influenced by ideological or radical factors, more technically qualified persons join various terror or extremist groups which use their expertise/services for various ‘tech operations’. Moreover, many of these outfits have Research & Development (R&D) wings whose main task is to manufacture weapons, explosive devices, detonating mechanisms and clandestine communication networks.
Context of India
In the context of India, which has been a victim of terror/extremist violence for many decades, the ‘techno-war’ assumes considerable significance from a national security angle. Starting with crude bombs/IEDs, the major terror/extremist groups operating in India have developed sophisticated electronic/explosive devices as well as detonating/remote control mechanisms to undertake their operations.
Our aviation sector, defense-sensitive establishments, commercial hubs, etc. were all targeted, besides the civilian population. Outfits such as the Maoists also have well-established Research and Development (R&D) units with highly qualified and skilled cadres who manufacture sophisticated devices for striking targets. Many such devices were used in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa.
The latest threat emanates from Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, operated by terror/militant groups, especially in border areas or sensitive regions. The intensive networking of terror/extremist groups, their transnational linkages, and easy channels for the transaction of terror finances such as Hawala money laundering, etc. all aggravate the intensity of the threat. They can easily mobilize the latest terrorist hardware either from their manufacturing hubs or through the intervention of the supply chains.
Therefore, both our ‘hum-int’ (human intelligence) and ‘tech-int’ (technical intelligence) channels need to be revamped, professionalized, and sensitised to meet the new challenges.
K V Thomas is a Senior Fellow at Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR)
Views expressed by the author are personal and need not reflect or represent the views of the Centre for Public Policy Research.
K V Thomas is Senior Fellow at CPPR. He has over 36 years of distinguished service in the Intelligence Bureau (Ministry of Home Affairs) of India where he rose to become the Associate Director. He can be contacted at [email protected]