In the 18th Lok Sabha election when every pollster, pundit and news report predicted the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) crossing the majority mark to form the government single-handedly, the Indian voters had other plans. Likewise, driven by a decade-long anti-incumbency wave along with the farmers’ and wrestlers’ protests, Congress’s comeback in Haryana seemed inevitable. However, defying all expectations, the BJP returned to power for a third consecutive term winning 48 seats in the 90-member constituent assembly, while the Congress settled for 37 seats.
Although the Congress improved its vote share to 39.09% – an 11% increase – bringing it almost on par with the BJP’s 39.94%, it did not necessarily translate into more seats. Even though in the first-past-the-post system, sheer margins in vote share can produce an unduly impact on seats, can the Congress party, which many believed was on the path to revival, overcome its dismal performance that easily?
Firstly, internal factionalism and the over-appeasement of one particular community proved detrimental to the Congress party. The party’s over-reliance on certain politicians coupled with the high command’s willingness to give them free rein, once again cost them dearly.
Haryana’s political landscape, often considered synonymous with Jat politics (with Jat constituting 26-28% of the total population), was expected to deliver a win for the Congress under the leadership of Bhupinder Singh Hooda, a prominent Jat face in the region. Naturally, Hooda assumed dominance within the party, alienating key allies, including Kumari Selja, who commands a considerable base of Dalit voters and has won a seat in the Lok Sabha election.
During ticket distribution, while the Hooda faction fielded around 70 candidates, Selja could only secure tickets for nine loyalists. An estranged Selja distanced herself from the campaigns, signalling clear internal strife in the party.
Despite several exit polls predicting an easy win for the Congress, limiting the BJP’s seat share to a maximum of 30, the former was swayed away by overconfidence. This complacency was evident in the leadership tussle for the Chief Minister’s positions among party stalwarts even before polling, as well as the party’s decision to put all its eggs in Hooda’s basket, discrediting the confluence of non-jat consolidation.
In a state with 17 seats reserved for Scheduled Castes (SC), the Congress party’s prospects would have been better if it had successfully captured these seats. In this regard, the sidelining of Kumari Selja proved costly. The Congress party’s vainglorious attitude was skillfully exploited by the BJP to paint a Jat vs non-Jat narrative, ultimately leading to Congress’s defeat.
Secondly, the party’s defeat in Haryana echoes a broader failure to learn from past mistakes. In Madhya Pradesh, a state that was battling 15 years of anti-incumbency under the BJP’s Shivraj Singh Chauhan, Congress had initially shown promise under Kamal Nath before the November 2023 assembly elections.
However, a public feud between Kamal Nath and senior leader Digvijaya Singh over ticket distribution combined with Nath’s refusal to form alliances with regional parties led to the party’s downfall. This is not a standalone incident. In Rajasthan, Ashok Gehlot used his full political vigour to fight his rival Sachin Pilot, awarding tickets to loyalists and unpopular candidates, ultimately contributing to the party’s loss.
Thirdly, the party’s failure to forge alliances with regional parties, like Indian National Lok Dal (INLD), which won two seats (Dabwali and Rania) and garnered 4.14% vote share, also contributed to its defeat by splitting the Jat votes in the state. While Rahul Gandhi advocated for contesting as many assembly elections as possible in alliance with the INDIA bloc allies, this idea was dismissed by prominent state leaders.
This resistance from ageing powerbrokers within the party to accommodate others – and, more importantly, to shift the focus from personal ambitions to a “party-first” approach – is costing Congress significantly. Additionally, marred by overconfidence the party overlooked the threat posed by rebels and independent candidates.
Thus, the deep-seated internal division bungled by the Congress’s high command along with the continued dominance of powerful political figures who have overstayed their welcome, has become an albatross around the party’s neck.
The time-honoured party that once ruled India for 54 years has now inevitably become a shadow of its former self. Whilst many applauded the Congress’s resurgence in the Lok Sabha elections, the defeat at the hands of the BJP in Haryana, despite the latter fighting an uphill battle, raises serious questions about the party’s overall strategy and its ability to appeal to Indian voters.
If the party is genuinely serious about ‘revival’, it must begin with internal reform.
Instead of allowing the high command to be puppeteered by state-level stalwarts, Congress should consider a role reversal if it seeks true change. For instance, an in-depth analysis of the Haryana election results highlights the concerns of non-Jat communities about the return of Jat’s political dominance in the state. This contradicts the Congress’s broader narrative of being a party that champions the marginalized.
Secondly, though the yatras undertaken by Rahul Gandhi prior to the Lok Sabha have energised the karyakartas, maintaining this momentum requires more than enthusiasm. The party must modernize its outdated election engineering strategies and prioritize recognizing the contributions of its youth and grassroots workers if it wants to stay on the path of revival.
With the Maharashtra elections just days away and Congress being lambasted by its INDIA bloc allies, the party must do a thorough introspection of its mistakes. If necessary, it should take a cue from Kamal Nath’s experience and make the difficult decision to remove entrenched leaders who have become obstacles to progress.
Sreelakshmi Harilal is an Associate – Research & Projects (Chairman’s Office) at Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR)
Views expressed by the author are personal and need not reflect or represent the views of the Centre for Public Policy Research.
Sreelakshmi holds an MSc in International Development from the University of Birmingham and BA Honors Economics from Lady Shri Ram College for Women, University of Delhi. She has worked as Academic Coordinator at a Cambridge International School.