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Delhi Elections 2025: Decoding 1.0, 2.0, & 3.0
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February 11, 2025Jhaadu Loses Its Jaadu — Three Critical Factors Behind AAP’s Delhi Election Loss
Former CM Arvind Kejriwal lost to BJP’s Parvesh Sharma in New Delhi seat.
The results of the 2025 Delhi Assembly elections have painted a grim picture for the incumbent Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), with party supremo Arvind Kejriwal conceding defeat to BJP candidate Parvesh Sharma in his stronghold of New Delhi by a margin of 3,182 votes.
Riding on the momentum of the Anna Hazare-led Indian anti-corruption movement in 2011, the former bureaucrat-turned-politician, Arvind Kejriwal emerged as a formidable voice in Indian politics. Over the years, Kejriwal positioned himself as a champion of governance reforms, advocating transparency and development-driven policies. However, Delhi’s political landscape has undergone a significant shift, with voters expressing dissatisfaction over governance failures, internal party conflicts, and mounting allegations of corruption.
The defeat of AAP should not come as a surprise — not only due to its failure to heed the concerns of its citizens, but also because of its inability to effectively address pressing issues. Despite being recognised for its welfare-oriented policies, AAP was overshadowed by the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) aggressive campaign filled with ambitious promises, which strategically targeted key voter demographics.
Additionally, the BJP’s recent tax cuts aimed at the middle class further cemented its appeal. The situation was further aggravated by corruption allegations against AAP leaders, including Arvind Kejriwal’s arrest on bribery charges, which severely eroded public trust. A closer analysis of the election results highlights several critical factors that contributed to AAP’s defeat, marking a significant shift in Delhi’s political narrative.
Why AAP Lost Citadel Delhi — 3 Factors
Firstly, the anti-incumbency faced by AAP after being in power for a decade affected the party tremendously. The party failed miserably in addressing the pressing concerns of its citizenry, especially those of the middle class, which had once formed its strong voter base.
For instance, the 15-point “Kejriwal ki Guarantee” failed to resonate with voters as expected. While it included elaborate promises of freebies and certain waivers, it lacked concrete and well-defined strategies to tackle the worsening air and water quality, sanitation and waste management in the MCD region, and inflation, among other issues.
Additionally, the over-emphasis on Kejriwal, the constant tussle with the Centre, and the AAP government’s inability to take accountability for its failure in delivering good governance — choosing instead to accuse the Centre of creating roadblocks — were perceived by the public as mere excuses.
Secondly, Kejriwal’s carefully crafted image as an “aam aadmi” (common man) and his party’s “corruption-free governance” narrative came under severe scrutiny following his alleged involvement and subsequent arrest in connection with the Delhi liquor policy scam. While the public initially held some reservations about the allegations, the “Sheesh Mahal” controversy — where crores of rupees were reportedly spent on the lavish renovation of the chief minister’s residence — proved to be a fatal blow to his reputation as a clean politician.
For a decade, the people of Delhi embraced the idea of “Kejriwal for the state and Modi for the Centre”, indicating their preference for regional governance and national leadership. However, the outcome of this election sends a clear message — Delhi now prefers a “double-engine” government, ensuring seamless coordination and governance without constant friction between the state and the Centre.
Thirdly, while AAP remains a key partner in the I.N.D.I.A. alliance, formed under the leadership of the Congress party, the failure of both parties to forge an electoral alliance—and, more significantly, Congress’s strategic focus on undermining AAP in retaliation for its setbacks in the Punjab and Goa elections—also contributed to AAP’s defeat.
This internal discord within the I.N.D.I.A. bloc was aptly highlighted in Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah’s tweet:
“Aur lado aapas mein!!! (Keep fighting among yourselves)”.
However, caution must be exercised when interpreting the statement cited above as the third critical factor contributing to AAP’s loss.
An early analysis of the total vote share suggests that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), through a well-calibrated political strategy, successfully consolidated its voter base across caste and demographic lines, while also chipping away at AAP’s traditional support.
BJP’s victory can largely be attributed to its extensive digital campaigning, leveraging platforms like the NaMo app to directly engage with grassroots-level workers, and deploying key leaders from across the country to campaign in constituencies where their appeal aligned with local demographics. These meticulously crafted strategies, combined with an aggressive election narrative, ultimately played a decisive role in BJP’s triumph.
While many have raised concerns about whether our elections are becoming less rooted in democratic principles and increasingly driven by the provision of freebies and welfare benefits, the results of the Delhi Assembly elections provide a definitive answer.
The defeat of AAP, a party once lauded for its welfare measures, sends a strong message to all—when a government fails to listen to and address the real concerns of the people, prioritising short-term political gains over substantive governance, the long-term consequences can be severe. This was exemplified by the Congress party’s failure to even open its account for the third consecutive election, underscoring the heavy price of losing public trust.
This article was originally published in ABP Live.
D Dhanuraj is the Chairman at the Centre for Public Policy Research, Kochi.
Views expressed by the authors are personal and need not reflect or represent the views of the Centre for Public Policy Research.
Sreelakshmi holds an MSc in International Development from the University of Birmingham and BA Honors Economics from Lady Shri Ram College for Women, University of Delhi. She has worked as Academic Coordinator at a Cambridge International School.
