The Indo-Pacific, a geopolitical concept that encompasses the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single interconnected strategic space, has become a central focus of international relations and security discourse in the 21st century.

This vast region, home to a diverse array of nations, economies, and cultures, is undergoing a dynamic transformation shaped by shifting power dynamics, economic interdependence, and evolving security challenges.

At the forefront of this transformation is the rise of China as a major global power, accompanied by its growing assertiveness in the region. This has led to increased strategic competition, particularly between China and the United States, and has prompted countries in the region to reassess their strategic alignments and foreign policy priorities.

Along with the emergence of Indo-Pacific construct, India-Japan relations have transformed into a strategic partnership driven by shared interests in regional stability and a mutual commitment to a free, open, and inclusive regional order. This partnership, rooted in democratic values and a rules-based international order, has expanded across various domains, including defense and security, maritime cooperation, economic engagement, connectivity and infrastructure development.

The India-Japan Indo-Pacific partnership is not only a bilateral endeavour but also a key component of broader regional and global efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region. It is intertwined with other regional initiatives, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving India, Japan, the United States, and Australia, and complements the efforts of ASEAN-led mechanisms in promoting regional cooperation and integration.

This article provides an analysis of the dynamics of the India-Japan Indo-Pacific partnership by mapping  its evolution through four different phases. It also explores the future of the partnership and its broader implications for regional order and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

The Four Phases of the India-Japan Indo-Pacific Strategic Partnership

India-Japan relations fluctuated significantly during the Cold War period. Warmth in the relationship during the early 1950s gave way to limited engagement during the rest of the Cold War period, marked by infrequent high-level visits.

Though Japan’s economic assistance to India in the early 1990s fostered goodwill, Tokyo remained cautious about India’s economic reforms, and the 1998 Indian nuclear tests created further tensions. The relationship transformed significantly with Prime Minister Yoshirō Mori’s 2000 visit and the signing of the ‘Global Partnership.’

This shift was driven by changing Asian power dynamics, mutual strategic interests, and Japan’s recognition of India’s economic potential. India’s enhanced East Asia engagement aligned with Japan’s growing regional outlook, though strategic clarity emerged only after 2005.

This evolution reflected both countries’ adapting to new regional realities articulated through the Indo-Pacific regional imagination that resulted in the upgradation of the relationship into ‘Global and Strategic Partnership” in 2006.

The development of India-Japan Indo-Pacific strategic partnership can be understood through four distinct phases: conception, actualisation, consolidation, and resilience. Each phase has been shaped by a complex interplay of ideological and structural factors, domestic politics, and key personalities.

Phase 1: Conception (2007-2012)

This phase marked the conceptual foundation of the Indo-Pacific partnership between India and Japan, primarily initiated through Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s landmark “Confluence of Two Seas” speech in India’s Parliament in 2007. This phase introduced a new geographic imagination that unified the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single strategic space.

Abe’s vision incorporated the “Broader Asia” concept, which aimed to expand Japan’s strategic outlook beyond its traditional post-war boundaries and recognize India as a key player in Asian geopolitics. This conceptualization was driven by both Abe’s conservative nationalist agenda to break from post-war constraints and growing strategic concerns about China’s military modernization and maritime assertiveness.

The period witnessed significant developments in security cooperation, notably the signing of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008, which initiated maritime security collaboration and joint naval exercises. The institutional framework established during this phase included defense dialogue mechanisms, military-to-military cooperation, and regular port calls.

However, the broader multilateral Indo-Pacific vision faced initial setbacks due to Chinese opposition, political changes in Japan, India’s domestic political situation, and the 2008 financial crisis. Despite these challenges, the foundation laid during this phase continued through track 2 trilateral dialogues involving India, Japan, and the US, setting the stage for deeper strategic cooperation in subsequent phases.

The period was characterised by a focus on maritime security, particularly anti-piracy efforts and sea lane security, reflecting both countries’ shared interests in maintaining regional stability and secure sea lines of communication.

Phase 2: Actualization (2012-2016)

This period represents the actualization of the Indo-Pacific partnership between the two countries, marked by significant geopolitical shifts following the 2008 financial crisis. China’s emergence as a great power and its increasingly assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping from 2013 reshaped Asian geopolitics, prompting strategic recalibrations among regional powers.

This phase coincided with Prime Minister Abe’s return to power in Japan and the arrival of Modi government in India, both bringing more assertive foreign policy approaches to their respective nations. During this period, the Indo-Pacific concept evolved from a geographic construct to a strategic policy framework.

Abe formally introduced the term “Indo-Pacific” in 2013 and later expanded it into the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy in 2016. India, which had begun using the term “Indo-Pacific” officially in 2012, integrated it into its strategic discourse as an extension of its Look East Policy.

The elevation of bilateral relations to a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” in 2014 marked a significant milestone, accompanied by enhanced defense cooperation through agreements on defense equipment transfer and technology sharing.

Maritime security remained central to the partnership, with Japan’s permanent inclusion in the Malabar exercises in 2015 and the signing of classified military information-sharing agreements. The partnership also expanded into new areas, particularly infrastructure development, with Japan gaining access to strategic projects in India’s northeast region and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

While both nations shared concerns about China’s assertiveness, their responses remained measured, focusing on institutional and normative balancing rather than direct confrontation. This phase also saw the advancement of trilateral dialogues with the US and Australia, though structural limitations and divergent strategic priorities continued to influence the partnership’s scope and depth.

Phase 3: Consolidation (2017-2020)

Phase 3 marked a significant consolidation of the India-Japan Indo-Pacific partnership, primarily driven by Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda and China’s increasing assertiveness in the region. During this period, both India and Japan developed more nuanced approaches to the Indo-Pacific concept, distinguishing their positions from the confrontational US stance while maintaining strategic alignment.

Japan notably shifted from calling FOIP a ‘strategy’ to a ‘vision’ in 2018, emphasizing inclusivity and ASEAN centrality. Similarly, Modi’s 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue speech articulated India’s distinct Indo-Pacific vision, stressing openness and rules-based order.

The bilateral partnership demonstrated greater leadership in regional order building through institutional and normative balancing. Both countries initiated the ‘India-Japan Dialogue on ASEAN’ in 2017 to strengthen ASEAN centrality and unity.

They also expanded their cooperation into new domains, particularly infrastructure and connectivity, as evidenced by the launch of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and the Act East Forum in 2017. These initiatives were partly motivated by shared concerns about China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Security cooperation intensified with the establishment of the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in 2018 and its first meeting in 2019. The India-Japan-US trilateral was elevated to the summit level in 2018, and the Quad dialogue was revived at the official level in 2017, later upgraded to ministerial level in 2019.

The period also saw the emergence of third-country partnerships, with both nations collaborating on projects in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Africa. This phase reflected the maturation of the partnership, with both countries balancing their strategic interests while maintaining autonomy in their respective regional approaches.

Phase 4: Resilience (Post-COVID Era)

The COVID-19 pandemic and other global events, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, have further accelerated geopolitical rivalry and deglobalization trends. These developments have had significant implications for Indian and Japanese foreign policy, as well as for the India-Japan bilateral relationship.

The Galwan clash in 2020 between India and China marked a turning point in India’s perception of China, leading to a re-evaluation of its China policy and increased engagement in various bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral platforms to strengthen its position in the Indo-Pacific. Japan also recalibrated its strategic outlook in response to the changing global environment.

The Ukraine crisis introduced new complexities, with Japan aligning with Western sanctions while India maintained its strategic autonomy and historical ties with Russia. Despite this divergence, both nations demonstrated diplomatic maturity, preventing these differences from undermining their strategic partnership. India’s refusal of Japan’s request to use Mumbai as an aid collection point for Ukrainian refugees highlighted these challenges, yet both countries maintained constructive dialogue.

Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic, India-Japan ties were further strengthened in the post-COVID era, particularly in the areas of security and defense cooperation. Maritime security remained at the forefront of the India-Japan security agenda, with renewed attention to the South China Sea issue. Both countries expanded their military exercises and cooperation, including the signing of agreements to facilitate smoother supply exchanges and mutual access to military bases.

The India-Japan partnership also expanded into the realm of economic security, driven by the need to address supply chain vulnerabilities and over-dependence on China for critical materials. Both countries recognized the growing importance of emerging technologies in statecraft and actively pursued cooperation on resilient supply chains through initiatives such as the Quad and the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative.

The period saw significant advancement in mini-lateral cooperation, particularly through the Quad’s elevation to summit level in 2021. The Quad expanded beyond traditional security dialogue to encompass vaccine initiatives, critical technology cooperation, climate action, and maritime security.

The India-Japan partnership deepened through initiatives like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative and the 2023 Semiconductor Supply Chain Partnership. Their defense cooperation intensified with expanded military exercises, including Japan’s inaugural participation in India’s MILAN naval exercise (2022).

The Future of the India-Japan Indo-Pacific Partnership

The India-Japan Indo-Pacific strategic partnership has emerged as a key pillar of the evolving regional order. Driven by shared concerns about China’s rise and a commitment to a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, the partnership has expanded across various domains, including defense and security, maritime cooperation, infrastructure development, and economic security. Despite facing challenges and limitations, the India-Japan partnership is expected to remain a crucial anchor of stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, the partnership is not without its challenges. There are still some mismatches in the grand strategies of the two countries, and Japan’s constitutional constraints on defense and military cooperation remain a limiting factor. Despite these challenges, the India-Japan Indo-Pacific strategic partnership is poised to play an even greater role in shaping the regional order in the years to come.

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This analysis draws from the author’s research article titled “India, Japan and the Indo-Pacific: Evolution, Consolidation and Limitations of the Strategic Partnership,” published in the Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs (Vol 11(4) , 2024)

Jojin V John is an Hon. Senior Fellow, CPPR, and the Director, Korea Centre, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala

Views expressed by the author are personal and need not reflect or represent the views of the Centre for Public Policy Research.