The 18th BRICS Summit concluded in New Delhi under India’s chairship with the unanimous adoption of the 140-point New Delhi Declaration, themed “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” The declaration backed India and Brazil for expanded, permanent roles at the UN Security Council, condemned the Pahalgam terror attack and terrorism in all forms, pushed back against unilateral tariffs violating WTO rules, and called for restraint in West Asia alongside a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also avoided proposing a common BRICS currency, choosing instead to promote trade settlement in local currencies. In addition, it outlined an approach to AI governance focused on the interests of the Global South. On paper, this reads as a grouping speaking with unusual unity. The more difficult question is whether this unity can withstand BRICS’s own internal contradictions. On this point, the Centre for Public Policy Research’s (CPPR) recent issue brief on India’s priorities for the Summit offers a useful caution to overly optimistic assessments of the grouping’s cohesion.

BRICS operates without a formal charter or secretariat, which grants members flexibility without binding obligations, a structural feature that has allowed it to evolve from a pressure group challenging the IMF and World Bank into a parallel institution-builder anchored by the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). Since 2022, however, this evolution has taken on a sharper geopolitical and anti-Western tone, rebranding BRICS as a vehicle for Global South unity and a multipolar order. The New Delhi Declaration’s unanimous adoption fits this trajectory, but unanimity on a text is not the same as coherence in practice.

The enlargement to eleven members has strengthened BRICS’s claim to represent the Global South, but has also deepened contradictions the Declaration itself cannot resolve. Divergent positions among Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in West Asia, alongside the continuing India-China rivalry, show the difficulty of maintaining cohesion as membership diversifies. That leaders nonetheless found common language across such genuinely contested issues, from the Gaza ceasefire and the rights of the Palestinian people to a unified condemnation of terrorism, including specific reference to the April 2025 Jammu and Kashmir attack, represents a meaningful diplomatic achievement given the divergent positions members hold on these very questions. Still BRICS’s success should not be measured primarily by the scope of its declarations or the size of its membership. The real test, as it argues, is whether the grouping can convert this political weight into tangible, durable outcomes. 

India’s own position within this framework reflects a careful balancing act. New Delhi pursued UNSC reform with backing from China and Russia, secured through the Declaration, while continuing to defend South Africa’s G20 membership and maintain trade and technology ties with the West through simultaneous participation in BRICS, the G20, and the Quad. This is strategic autonomy in practice: engaging the Global South coalition without foreclosing Western partnerships, a posture the Summit outcome reinforces rather than resolves.

The bilateral dynamic between India and China warrants close examination. Following a prolonged period of strained relations after the 2020 Galwan Valley border conflict, ties entered a delicate recovery phase highlighted by a significant diplomatic shift in September 2026. This transition was seen when Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, accompanied by an expansive delegation that featured a substantial corporate and business contingent (Razdan et al. 2026, Reuters 2026; Deccan Chronicle 2026), though it remains too early to read this as a definitive policy reorientation. CPPR’s brief had floated a joint India-China communique at the Summit’s conclusion as a tangible signal of cooperation despite the unresolved border dispute. The unanimous adoption of the New Delhi Declaration itself, with both countries as co-signatories, arguably delivers a version of this confidence-building function, even without a bilateral statement.

On the economic and technological front, the Summit’s endorsement of local-currency settlement over a common currency, and its silence on any near-term monetary union, tracks closely with CPPR’s recommendation that BRICS prioritise practical steps, expanding local-currency trade and cross-border adoption of digital payment systems like India’s UPI, over more ambitious but currently unworkable proposals. Similarly, the Declaration’s AI governance framework, oriented toward the Global South, echoes CPPR’s call for India to promote “AI for All” / Responsible AI as alternatives to exclusive blocs such as China’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) initiative, even as the underlying AI capability gap between India and China remains a genuine cross-cutting concern.

What the New Delhi Declaration demonstrates is that BRICS retains the diplomatic capacity to reach unanimous agreement on a substantive document, no small feat given the divergent positions members hold on several issues it addresses. What remains uncertain is whether this consensus can translate into coordinated action, a distinction that matters more than the declaration’s scope or ambition. This observation points to a broader inflection point for the organization. Sustained coordination among member states could consolidate BRICS’s standing as a credible representative voice for the Global South, whereas continued expansion in the absence of deeper institutional cohesion risks reducing it to a primarily declaratory grouping. Ultimately, the bloc’s long-term significance will not be determined by the scale of its membership or the rhetorical ambition of its declarations, but by whether the dialogue initiated in New Delhi translates into durable, substantive outcomes.

References:

1. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 2026. “New Delhi Declaration: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” September 12, 2026. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/41776
2. Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR). 2026. “The 18th BRICS Summit: India’s Priorities and the Future of the Global South.” Policy Brief. Kochi: Centre for Public Policy Research. https://www.cppr.in/policy-briefs/18th-brics-summit-global-south
3. Reuters. “China’s Xi Likely to Visit India for BRICS Summit with 400-Member Delegation.” Business Today, August 25, 2026. https://www.businesstoday.in/world/story/xi-jinping-likely-to-visit-india-after-7-years-for-brics-summit-may-bring-400-member-delegation-551216-2026-08-25.  
4. Deccan Chronicle. 2026. “China Confirms Xi’s Presence at BRICS, Brings 400 People Delegation for Talks.” Deccan Chronicle, September 10, 2026. https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/china-confirms-xis-presence-at-brics-brings-400-people-delegation-for-talks-1986490.
5. Pandalai, Shruti. 2026. “What the West Should Make of Xi’s Return to Delhi for the BRICS.” The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, September 11, 2026. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-the-west-should-make-of-xi-s-return-to-delhi-for-the-brics.
6. Razdan, Khushboo, Orange Wang, Mark Magnier, and Nayan Seth. “Xi Tells Modi China and India Bear ‘Significant Responsibilities’ in Turbulent World.” South China Morning Post, September 12, 2026. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3367314/xi-tells-modi-there-ample-scope-learn-each-others-strengths.

Mukund T is an Associate, Research – International Relations at the Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), Kochi. 

Views expressed by the authors are personal and need not reflect or represent the views of the Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR).

Mukund T

Associate, Research – International Relations at CPPR | [email protected] |  + postsBio

Mukund T is an Associate, Research – International Relations at the Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), Kochi. He holds a postgraduate degree in International Relations from CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru, and a bachelor's degree in English, Political Science, and History from the same institution.