Public Choice Theory Podcast Series (Malayalam)
Public Choice Theory highlights how political outcomes are shaped not only by individual preferences, but by the rules under which collective decisions are made. In this episode of Policy Beyond Politics, titled “The Rules of the Game: Constitutions and Public Accountability,” the discussion examines constitutions as foundational frameworks that structure political incentives, limit the misuse of power, and promote accountable governance.
Drawing primarily from Chapters 10 (The Role of Constitutions) and 11 (Achievements and Issues) of Public Choice: A Primer by Eamonn Butler, the episode explores how constitutional rules influence decision-making costs, fiscal discipline, and the balance between efficiency and representation in democratic systems.
Constitutions as Rules, Not Symbols
The episode begins by unpacking why societies need constitutions beyond their symbolic or legal significance. From a Public Choice perspective, constitutions function as pre-agreed rules of the game that constrain political actors, reduce uncertainty, and shape incentives. By defining how power is allocated and decisions are made, constitutional rules help prevent dominance by narrow interests and curb opportunistic political behaviour.
Decision-Making Costs and Collective Choice
A central theme of the discussion is the economic logic of constitutions. The episode highlights how constitutional rules help reduce the costs of collective decision-making by setting procedures, thresholds, and limits. These constraints balance inclusiveness with efficiency, ensuring that governance does not collapse into endless bargaining or unchecked majoritarianism.
Fiscal Constitution and Public Accountability
The conversation then turns to James Buchanan’s concept of the fiscal constitution, which argues for binding rules on government spending, taxation, and borrowing. From a Public Choice standpoint, such fiscal rules are essential to prevent politically motivated overuse of public resources, intergenerational debt shifting, and short-term populism, thereby strengthening accountability in public finance.
Federalism and Decentralised Governance
Another key focus is federalism, viewed as a constitutional mechanism that divides power across levels of government. The episode discusses how decentralisation can improve responsiveness, enhance local accountability, and create institutional competition, while also addressing the trade-offs involved in coordination and scale.
Achievements and Ongoing Challenges
In the latter part of the episode, the discussion critically examines the achievements and limitations of constitutional governance. It addresses enduring questions within Public Choice theory—whether self-interested political actors can reliably act in the public interest, how effective constitutional constraints are in practice, and what challenges remain in designing institutions that genuinely align incentives with collective welfare.
Key Takeaways
- Constitutions act as foundational rules that shape political incentives and outcomes
- Constitutional design helps reduce decision-making costs in collective governance
- Fiscal rules and federalism are key tools for limiting power and improving accountability
- Public Choice theory highlights both the strengths and limits of constitutional constraints
About the Podcast:
The fifth episode of the Policy Beyond Politics podcast series, based on Public Choice: A Primer by Dr. Eamonn Butler, deepens the discussion on how constitutional rules influence governance and accountability. Published by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), United Kingdom, the series aims to make Public Choice theory accessible to wider and regional audiences, building on its Malayalam translation to connect abstract theory with real-world political and economic experiences.
Tune in to explore how rules before rulers shape democratic decision-making, public finance, and institutional accountability.
Guest: Dr Neeraja James, Assistant Professor and Head, Department of Economics, St. Albert’s College, Ernakulam
Host: Sreelakshmi Harilal, Associate (Research & Projects), CPPR
Click to read the Malayalam-translated eBook of “Public Choice: A Primer” by Dr Eamonn Butler, published by CPPR.
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